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THE RIGHT TO FREELY HAVE SEX?
BEYOND BIOLOGY: REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
AND SEXUAL SELF-DETERMINATION
Yakaré-Oulé Jansen∗

INTRODUCTION
Sex is a difficult subject for us. It is an inevitable part of our lives
and identities, no matter how we choose to deal with it; either by living a
life of celibacy or by means of an open manifestation of our sexuality.
Yet, like that other notorious constant factor in life, death, we find it
very difficult to discuss anything having to do with it. Some of the
greatest minds in history have struggled with the subject,1 and the great

∗
LL.M., Columbia University School of Law, 2006; Meester in de Rechten (J.D./LL.B. equiv.)
Dutch Civil Law, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2005; Meester in de Rechten
(J.D./LL.B. equiv.) International & European Law, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands,
2005.
1. Although sometimes contradictory in his statements on love and sex, Plato generally
considered sex to be of secondary importance. In his ode to love, The Symposium, he emphasizes
that virtuous love between men should not be about sex, but about improvement and education of
the soul. PLATO, The Symposium, in PLATO’S EROTIC DIALOGUES 15, 21-25 (William S. Cobb
trans., State University of New York Press 1993) (1800). In The Republic, he in fact argues for free
sex, but only as a means to satisfy what he considers more of an animal appetite that sometimes
cannot be suppressed and which has the sole aim of breeding children. PLATO, PLATO’S REPUBLIC
117 (G.M.A. Grube trans., Hackett Publishing Co. 1974). Descartes considered the mind to be
separate from the mechanical body, considering man a spirit who makes use of a body. RENÉ
DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON THE METHOD AND MEDIATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 3 (David
Weissman ed., Yale University Press 1996). Schopenhauer acknowledged that sex permeates
everything in our lives, but he never hid his disdain for matters related to love, which he considered
an illusion, a trick of nature to facilitate sex between partners that make a good genetic match.
ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, Metaphysics of Love, in ESSAYS OF SCHOPENHAUER, available at http:/
/etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/s/schopenhauer/arthur/essays/chapter12.html (originally published in
the second edition of DIE WELT ALS WILLE UND VORSTELLUNG [THE WORLD AS WILL AND
REPRESENTATION] in 1844). But the most prominent name that springs to mind when talking about
sex is Freud, who allegedly said that "the only unnatural sexual behavior is none at all" and
published his DREI ABHANDLUNGEN ZUR SEXUAL THEORIA in 1905 (SIGMUND FREUD, THREE
ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY (James Strachey trans., The Alcuin Press 1949)).
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taboo on nudity and sex in American media2 shows that even societies
which boast an enormous sex industry3 sometimes still do not quite
know how to deal with sex in day-to-day life. Yet, sex is at the basis of
our very existence, not only for the biological aspect of procreation, but
also because of its connection to our deepest sense of self. Sex is one of
the most private aspects of who we are.
How does the law deal with sex? How is sex part of the human
rights body? What rights related to sex exist and, more specifically,
what is the position of women in all of this?4
At the International Conference on Population and Development
held in Cairo in 1994, the following definition of reproductive health
was endorsed by 165 nations:
Reproductive health is a state of complete physical, mental and social
well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity, in all
matters relating to the reproductive system and to its functions and
processes. Reproductive health therefore implies that people are able
to have a satisfying and safe sex life and that they have the capability
to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when and how often to do
so. Implicit in this last condition is the right of men and women to be
informed and to have access to safe, effective, affordable and
acceptable methods of family planning of their choice, as well as other
methods of their choice for regulation of fertility which are not against
the law, and the right of access to appropriate health-care services that
will enable women to go safely through pregnancy and childbirth and
provide couples with the best chance of having a healthy infant.

2. A recent example is the storm caused by the event referred to in the media as ‘nipplegate’
when during a performance on MTV’s Superbowl Football Show, singer Justin Timberlake exposed
the breast of Janet Jackson. The broadcasting network CBS was subsequently flooded with
complaints of families, stating that “the family tradition had been interrupted by unexpected nudity”
and received a fine of $550,000 USD. Julie Hilden, Jackson ‘Nipplegate’ illustrates danger of
chilling free speech, CNN, (Feb. 20, 2004), http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/02/20/
findlaw.analysis.hilden.jackson/index.html.
3. The US porn industry has been estimated to generate between $10 billion and $12 billion
USD in annual profits. A great number of Fortune 500 companies, like AT&T and Time Warner,
collect a significant portion of that sum. See James Harder, Porn 500 – blue chip connections to
porn industry – Statistical Data Included, Jan. 8, 2001, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/
mi_m1571/is_2_17/ai_72273779; Timothy Egan, Wall Street Meets Pornography, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
23,
2000,
at
A1,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/23/technology/
23PORN.html?ex=1145246400&en=c98aee53f024bce0&ei=5070.
4. A number of issues raised in this article can be applied to matters of sexual orientation,
and on occasion the topic will come up to support an argument made for women’s rights. The focus,
however, will primarily be on women because it would be impossible to do justice to the sexual
orientation perspective within the confines of this brief article.
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[emphasis added]5

The Cairo Programme’s definition of reproductive health was
affirmed and elaborated a year later by the Beijing Declaration and
Platform for Action:
The human rights of women include their right to have control over
and decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality,
including sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion,
discrimination and violence. Equal relationships between women and
men in matters of reproduction, including full respect for the integrity
of the person, require mutual respect, consent and shared responsibility
for sexual behaviour and its consequences. [emphasis added]6

The aim of this article is to explore the extent to which women’s
reproductive rights embrace the concept of sexual self-determination,7
i.e., the right of women to enjoy their sexuality on an equal basis with
men, free from any form of coercion or pressure and with the freedom to
decide if and when to reproduce. My thesis is that so far the focus has
primarily been on reproductive health and that women’s equality in the
sexual arena warrants more attention as it is both interconnected with a
number of fundamental human rights and an important aspect of the
general concept of self-determination, which women should be able to
pursue on a par with men.
Part I will briefly set out how sexual rights are approached in the
national legal arena. The way the U.S. Supreme Court treats
reproductive rights provides a good example as it has some analogies
with the treatment of reproductive rights under international human
rights law;8 the Court focuses primarily on the biological aspects of
sexuality and has been reluctant to acknowledge rights that fall within
the realm of sexual self-determination.9 This case study is followed in
5. Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development,
Cairo, Egypt, Sept. 5-13, 1994, ch. 7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.171/13/Rev.1 (Mar. 1995) [hereinafter
ICPD Programme of Action].
6. Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Fourth World Conference on Women,
Beijing, China, Sept. 4-15, 1995, ch. IV, § C, para. 96, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20 (1996)
[hereinafter Beijing Declaration & Platform for Action].
7. As this survey pertains to the freedom to make independent decisions about one’s sex life
on the basis of international human rights norms, I prefer to use the term “sexual selfdetermination” to distinguish it from the terms used for this concept within national law, such as
“sexual sovereignty” and “sexual citizenship,” in particular because of the link it suggests between
sexuality and self-realization. The term “sexual rights” has a more general scope but is used
interchangeably with “reproductive rights” on occasion.
8. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558.
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Part II by an analysis of to what extent the treaty bodies of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”),
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(“ICESCR”) and Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”) consider women’s
sexuality in connection with the reproductive rights found in the
respective treaties and to what degree these comments extend beyond the
realm of reproductive health. I will then proceed with an evaluation of
the need for a more extensive interpretation or an adjusted definition of
reproductive rights in Part III.
PART I: LAW AND SEXUALITY
When it comes to sex, women are primarily the ones to find that
their bodies are highly regulated by the law. Laws on abortion,
contraception, and maternal conduct during pregnancy as well as welfare
regulations intended to deter women from having children10 hardly affect
men. In addition, there are a number of persistent stereotypes to
complicate matters, both on a personal level and in the legal arena,
where equality according to the letter of the law does not always apply
in practice due to its application by judges or juries.11 This treatment of
women and their sexuality fits within a historical pattern, in which a
woman’s sexuality was not hers to make decisions on; across cultures,
her sexuality belonged to her family, tribe, or lineage and not to
herself.12 Securing a good marriage had financial consequences for a
10. For an extensive overview of the problems women encounter when it comes to these
matters, see JUDITH GREENBERG, MARTHA MINOW & DOROTHY ROBERTS, MARY JOE FRUG’S
WOMEN AND THE LAW 649-776 (3d ed. 2004).
11. Consider the way a woman’s behavior as a wife and mother is evaluated as opposed to the
behavior of the father when pursuing a career at the same time as raising a family and how this
reflects on custody decisions. D. Kelly Weisberg points out a number of gender stereotypes,
including the performance of certain symbolic child care tasks a mother “should” perform, and the
consideration that a woman’s dedication to her career is a sign of unfitness as a parent, which stands
in stark contrast of the man’s idealized image as a “good provider” when he spends a significant
amount of time on work instead of his family. D. Kelly Weisberg, Professional Women and the
Professionalization of Motherhood: Marcia Clark's Double Bind, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L. J. 295,
313-38 (1995). On equal opportunities in the workplace and its distortion due to fixed ideas about
gender, see generally Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories about Women and Work: Judicial
Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest
Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (1990). On the impact of race and gender on rape law, see
generally Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Identity Politics, Intersectionality and
Violence against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991). On unconscious bias and equal
employment opportunity legislation, see generally Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47
STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995).
12. Oliver Phillips, A Brief Introduction to the Relationship Between Sexuality and Rights, 33
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woman’s family or tribe, and in order for a good marriage to be secured,
a woman (or girl) had to be chaste before anything else.13 Forced
marriages and dowers may not be the order of the day in this
hemisphere,14 but it can be argued that women’s sovereignty over their
bodies continues to be severely curtailed until this day, be it by different
means.
There are no sexual rights mentioned in the Constitution. The right
to use contraception and the right to have an abortion, however, have
been brought under the heading of privacy by the Supreme Court.15 The
connection between privacy and sex seems to be quite a natural
combination; Abramson refers to them as “natural bedfellows.”16
Probably most of us would answer ‘no’ when asked whether we would
like the State in our bedrooms, the place where we commit our most
private acts. Yet, the Supreme Court’s notion of privacy all but allows us
to do whatever we please in private, drawing the line when it no longer
comes to reproductive sex.17
The Griswold case18 recognized the right to make decisions on

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 451, 464 (2005).
13. Id.
14. Obtaining statistics on the prevalence of forced marriages in the United States and Europe
has proven to be difficult. In a 2005 publication on legislation on forced marriages in Council of
Europe countries, the Council concluded that none of the surveyed countries had carried out any
thorough quantitative research on the matter. Edwige Rude-Antoine, Forced marriages in Council
of
Europe
member
states:
A
Comparative
Study
of
Legislation and Political Initiatives, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 7 (2005), available at http://
www.coe.int/T/E/Human_Rights/Equality/PDF_CDEG%282005%291_E.pdf. Generally, countries
make a connection between the prevalence of forced marriages and migration flows, an example of
which is the Norwegian Human Rights Service’s publication on the position of Muslim women in
Norway, HEGE STORHAUG & HUMAN RIGHTS SERVICE, FEMININ INTEGRERING - UTFORDRINGER I
ET FLERETNISK SAMFUNN [HUMAN VISAS: A REPORT FROM THE FRONT LINES OF EUROPE’S
INTEGRATION CRISIS] (2003).
15. Vehemently opposing the public/private distinction is Catharine MacKinnon, who argues
that privacy is a false notion for women, as the private sphere is constructed to perpetuate abuse
against women. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 168-69
(1989). See also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
LAW (Harvard University Press 1987). Denominating certain matters as strictly private arguably
takes away the responsibility of government to undertake action as well as for human rights groups
to intervene. See Dina Bogecho, Putting it to Good Use: The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and Women’s Right to Reproductive Health, 13 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD.
229 (2004).
16. PAUL R. ABRAMSON, STEVEN D. PINKERTON & MARK HUPPIN, SEXUAL RIGHTS IN
AMERICA: THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 45 (NYU PRESS 2003).
17. See, e.g,. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 153-54 (1973); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
18. Griswold,, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
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contraception under the denominator of privacy, as did Roe v. Wade19 for
the right to have an abortion. Yet as soon as the link with reproduction is
missing, the privacy argument appears to lose its persuasiveness for the
Court. In Bowers v. Hardwick,20 the Supreme Court concluded that
privacy did not extend to homosexual relationships, upholding a Georgia
statute against sodomy. In the more recent Lawrence v. Texas,21 the
Court tackles the problem of same-sex sexual relations from a different
angle: liberty.22 The decision has been celebrated as heralding the next
step in the struggle for gay and lesbian equality, but when one reads the
judgment closely, the Court has not been as generous at it may seem.
Strictly speaking, the sex in this case could never actually be
reproductive, but the way the Court interprets the type of relationship
between the two men does evoke all the traditional connotations that
come up with the idea of reproductive sex.23 As Katherine Franke argues
in her critical reading of Lawrence,24 the Court – in spite of its
qualification of sodomy laws as “demeaning the lives of homosexual
persons”25 – stresses in several ways that the relationship between
Lawrence and his partner resembles that of a married couple and that the
sex constitutes but an element in a more enduring bond.26 “More
enduring than what?” Franke rightly asks, “Than sex?”27
Franke observes that Lawrence acknowledges sex only as
instrumental to the formation of intimate relationships and not as
something that has a social or legal status in its own right.28 Obviously,
the Court did not take to heart the dissent written by Justice Blackmun in
the Bowers case:
19. Roe,, 410 U.S. at 153-54.
20. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
21. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
22. It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court is willing to approach the issue of
abortion from the same angle. Several European Constitutional Courts have taken this stance,
declaring that liberal abortion laws are consistent with women’s right to liberty. See, e.g.
Juristenvereniging Pro Vita/ De Staat der Nederlanden, Hoge Raad, The Hague, February 8, 1990,
NJ 413, 707 (English summary in 19(5) EUR. LAW. D. 179-180 (1991))
23. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
24. Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 1399, 1408 (2004).
25. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
26. Id.
27. Franke, supra note 24, at 1408.
28. Id. at 1417. Lisa Rabie argues that the Court in Lawrence does hint at the principles
constituting full sexual citizenship (sexual equality, sexual dignity, and sexual privacy), but stops
short of formulating any robust notion of sexual citizenship and instead creates a very narrow liberty
right. Lisa Limor Rabie, Can You Put on Your Red Light?: Lawrence’s Sexual Citizenship Rights in
Terms of International Law, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 613, 616 (2005).
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Only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that sexual
intimacy is “a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to
family life, community welfare, and the development of human
personality” . . . . The fact that individuals define themselves in a
significant way through their intimate sexual relationships with others
suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours, that there may be many ‘right’
ways of conducting those relationships, and that much of the richness
of a relationship will come from the freedom an individual has to
choose the form and nature of these intensely personal bonds. . . . The
Court claims that its decision today merely refuses to recognize a
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy; what the Court
really has refused to recognize is the fundamental interest all
individuals have in controlling the nature of their intimate associations
with others.29

Blackmun is right, and – as Franke points out – the Supreme Court
got it wrong again in Lawrence. Abramson argues: “Sexual choices
reflect individual rights, not rights that emerge only in relationships;
these rights are not limited to dyads, whether heterosexual or
homosexual, or to particular types of relationships (e.g., marriage).”30
But without explicit wording in the law, and a Court that is not willing to
give much freedom to individuals to determine what they want to do
with their bodies together with other consenting adults, there appears not
to be much room for independent sexual rights outside the sphere of
marriage or marriage-like relationships.
PART II: SEXUAL RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS
A. Sexual rights as human rights
Not all rights are enumerated. This goes for both national
legislation (see, for example, the body of rights that has been read into
the Constitution) and the international human rights treaty regimes with
their subsequent comments, explanations, and interpretations by both
treaty monitoring bodies and courts. The premise that sexual expression
or self-determination is a natural right seems viable,31 applicable to each
and every one of us, as it goes to the very heart of our existence, whether
you would like to place it under the Constitutional denominator of the
29. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 205-06.
30. ABRAMSON ET AL., supra note 16, at 16.
31. Id. at 74-77.
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‘pursuit of happiness,’32 the right to be able to determine the way one
leads one’s life in a way one sees fit, or under any of the rights embodied
in the current human rights treaty regime pertaining to some form of
self-determination. Naturally, there are limitations that should be
considered as on the exercise of almost any of the other rights and
freedoms. Enjoyment of one’s rights should not encroach upon another
person’s rights and freedoms, which means that certain forms of sexual
expression – such as sex involving partners who did not consent or are
not in a position to reasonably do so – may be legitimately regulated.33
The Center for Reproductive Rights (“CRR”), in its publication
‘Reproductive Rights are Human Rights,’34 voices the idea that all
persons have reproductive rights, founded upon principles of human
dignity and equality.35 These reproductive and sexual rights can be
divided into a number of principles that fall into two categories: the right
to reproductive health care and the right to reproductive selfdetermination. According to the CRR, they are “grounded in some of the
oldest recognized human rights.”36 The Cairo Programme of Action
32. Id.
33. Examples mentioned by Fried and Landsberg-Lewis are rape and incest. Susana T. Fried
& Ilana Landsberg-Lewis, Sexual Rights: From Concept to Strategy, in WOMEN AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, Vol. 3, 92 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean Koenig eds., Transnational
Publishers 2001). A difficulty is that some would argue that same-sex relations offend a public
sense of morality and therefore fall within the permissible area of control under the law. Arguably, a
moral offense is not the same as a mental or physical harm, but it is certainly difficult to draw the
line by either standard as there are always situations that do not conform to the rule. One could think
of S/M sex between consenting adults, which strictly speaking can involve physical harm but on a
voluntary basis, or marital rape, which involves both non-consent and mental or physical harm, but
often is not proscribed by law.
34. CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS ARE HUMAN RIGHTS (4th
ed. 2003), available at http://www.reproductiverights.org/pub_bo_rrhr.html.
35. Id.
36. The Center for Reproductive Rights and Policy and University of Toronto International
Programme on Reproductive and Sexual Health Law, Bringing Rights to Bear: An Analysis of the
Work of UN Treaty Monitoring Bodies on Reproductive and Sexual Rights, 17 (2002). For the
subject of sexual self-determination, a number of the ‘Ten Human Rights Keys to Reproductive
Rights’ are relevant: the right to life, liberty, and security, Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 3, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR], International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 6(1), 9(1), U.N. Doc. A/6316
(Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]; the right to health, reproductive health, and family planning,
International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art.
10(2), 12(1), & 12(2), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICESCR], Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), G.A. Res. 34/180, art. 10(h),
12(1), 12(2) & 14(2), U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (Dec. 18, 1979) [hereinafter CEDAW]); the right to decide
the number and spacing of children, CEDAW, supra, at art. 16(1); the right to privacy, ICCPR,
supra, at art. 17(1), 17(2); the right to be free from discrimination on specified grounds, UDHR,
supra, at art. 2, ICESCR, supra, at art. 2(2), ICCPR, supra, at art. 2(1), CEDAW, supra, at art. 1(3),
& 11(2); and the right to be free from sexual violence, CEDAW, supra, at art. 5(a), 6, CENTER FOR
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affirms that reproductive rights are already embedded within the current
international framework:
[R]eproductive rights embrace certain human rights that are already
recognized in national laws, international laws and international human
rights documents and other consensus documents. These rights rest on
the recognition of the basic right of all couples and individuals to
decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing and timing of their
children and to have the information and means to do so, and the right
to attain the highest standard of sexual and reproductive health. It also
includes the right to make decisions regarding reproduction free of
discrimination, coercion and violence, as expressed in human rights
documents.37

Incorporated in this right is the ability to “have a satisfying and safe
sex life” and the capability “to reproduce and the freedom to decide if,
when and how often to do so.”38
In spite of this broad phrasing, the Cairo Programme of Action as a
whole (as well as the Beijing Declaration one year later39) places great
emphasis on sex as a biological function. The greatest concerns appear
to be family planning and the good health of mothers and children. The
second focal point is freedom from violence or coercion. The linkage of
reproductive health and protection from sexual harm with human rights
may have reached a broad audience, but it is questionable whether it
does the overall case for women’s equality much good. As Alice Miller
argues, a focus on women reduced to “suffering bodies in need of
protection by the law and by the State” can frustrate more fundamental
goals, such as women’s need for participation and equality.40 Franke
asserts that women’s rights to enjoy their own bodies is generally absent
from feminist legal theory, the debate being focused on framing female
sexuality as a question of dependency or danger rather than a source of
pleasure.41 Moreover, she asks why the fact that most women will be

REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, supra note 34 at 41).
37. ICPD Programme of Action, supra note 5, at ch. 7. The Beijing Platform affirms what is
said in the Cairo Declaration, by stating that “reproductive rights embrace certain human rights that
are already recognized in national laws, international human rights documents and other consensus
documents.” Beijing Declaration & Platform for Action, supra note 6, at para. 95.
38. ICPD Programme of Action, supra note 5, at ch. 7.
39. Beijing Declaration & Platform for Action, supra note 6.
40. Alice Miller, Sexuality, Violence Against Women and Human Rights: Women make
Demands and Ladies get Protection, Health & Human Rights: An International Journal 16, 25
(2004).
41. Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law and Desire, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 181, 199 (2001).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007

9

Akron Law Review, Vol. 40 [2007], Iss. 2, Art. 3
JANSENFINAL.DOC

320

3/30/2007 12:51:26 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[40:311

reproductive is so readily accepted.42 Sex beyond reproduction – just for
pleasure, between same-sex partners or for economic motives – takes the
back seat here, just as it does for the Supreme Court. Focusing on the
reproductive aspect of sexual rights keeps the discussion safely in the
biological realm. As Philips argues:
By marginalizing that sex which is not reproductive, this approach . . .
presents a key method of building a broad-based consensus. But it
simultaneously fails to address the rights of those whose sexual
behavior does not fit within a reproductive paradigm, who do not fit
the chaste model of the innocent victim, and who are often most
vulnerable to sexual exploitation and discrimination.43

B. The doctrine of reproductive self-determination and its interpretation
by the treaty monitoring bodies
1. The treaty monitoring bodies
The three major human rights treaties under discussion here each
have a committee44 mandated to monitor the States Parties’ compliance
42. Id. at 183-97.
43. Phillips, supra note 12, at 461-62. For a critical evaluation of the progress made after the
Cairo Conference, see Sumati Nair, Preeti Kirbat and Sarah Sexton, A Decade After Cairo,
Women’s Health in a Free Market Economy, THE CORNER HOUSE, Summer 2004, available at
http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/summary.shtml?x=62140. The authors argue that the Cairo
Programme in fact endorsed a neo-liberal framework for reproductive health policy, in recent years
most visibly executed in the context of international trade agreements. This is the result of women’s
organizations placing too much emphasis on reaching a common ground with population
organizations, donor groups, and governments, resulting in an actual deterioration of women’s
access to reproductive health services in a great number of countries. Id. at 9-10.
44. The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) is
established under article 17 of the treaty:
(1) For the purpose of considering the progress made in the implementation
of the present Convention, there shall be established a Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (hereinafter referred to as the
Committee) consisting, at the time of entry into force of the Convention, of
eighteen and, after ratification of or accession to the Convention by the thirtyfifth State Party, of twenty-three experts of high moral standing and
competence in the field covered by the Convention. The experts shall be
elected by States Parties from among their nationals and shall serve in their
personal capacity, consideration being given to equitable geographical
distribution and to the representation of the different forms of civilization as
well as the principal legal systems. (2) The members of the Committee shall
be elected by secret ballot from a list of persons nominated by States Parties.
Each State Party may nominate one person from among its own nationals.
CEDAW, supra note 36, at art. 17. The ICCPR provides for the establishment of the Human Rights
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with the treaty obligations by examining periodical country reports.45
When a country report has been submitted, the independent human
rights experts of the treaty body meet with representatives of the country
under review, NGOs and UN agencies, after which consultations the
committee sends its concluding observations to the reporting
government.46 Although the concluding observations are not legally
binding, they can provide guidelines on the interpretation of treaty
provisions in the same way that jurisprudence can clarify national
legislation. Much depends, though, on the clarity of the country report
and the data provided therein.47
In addition, the committees can issue general comments and general
recommendations48 as they see fit. These comments and
recommendations are intended to give guidelines to States Parties on
how to interpret the often broadly formulated human rights provisions
and thus help governments with their proper implementation. As the
committees are not judicial bodies and therefore cannot issue binding
decisions,49 the recommendations are, at most, an authoritative
Committee (“HRC”) in article 28:
(1) There shall be established a Human Rights Committee (hereafter referred to in the
present Covenant as the Committee). It shall consist of eighteen members and shall carry
out the functions hereinafter provided. (2) The Committee shall be composed of
nationals of the States Parties to the present Covenant who shall be persons of high
moral character and recognized competence in the field of human rights, consideration
being given to the usefulness of the participation of some persons having legal
experience. (3) The members of the Committee shall be elected and shall serve in their
personal capacity.
ICCPR, supra note 36, at art. 28. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(“CESCR”) was established by the Economic and Social Council instead of under the ICESCR.
Economic and Social Council, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
ESC Res. 1985/17, U.N. Doc. No. E/1985/85.
45. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Treaty Bodies
(Feb. 2002), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/leafletontreatybodies.pdf.
46. A yearly report of all concluding observations is sent to the UN General Assembly. An
NGO is a non-governmental organization. See http://www.un.org/dpi/ngosection/index.asp.
47. In addition to relevant and sufficiently detailed data information, it is important that the
obligations, as well as the required performance standards, of States Parties with respect to the right
under review are clear. See Audrey Chapman, The Right to Health: Monitoring Women’s Right to
Health Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 44 AM. U. L.
REV. 1157, 1158-59 (1995).
48. CEDAW refers to its general comments as “general recommendations.”
49. Both the ICCPR and CEDAW have an Optional Protocol under which individuals (and, in
the case of CEDAW, individuals and groups) can bring complaints. The decisions of the committees
are not enforceable, but by signing the Optional Protocol, States Parties have agreed to be bound to
the judgments on the cases brought. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966). See also Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, G.A. Res. 54/4,
U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (Dec. 10, 1999).
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interpretation of the rights embodied in the treaties. They also influence
the concluding observations. By providing a clearer standard of
compliance for States Parties, the concluding observations can be more
specific as to what behavior is acceptable and what is not, which in turn
contributes to the development of clearer standards by which to judge
the States Parties.
2. The doctrine of sexual self-determination
When looking at the treaty monitoring bodies’ consideration of
sexual rights, one notices an interesting dichotomy. As relatively
progressive as the committees are when considering matters related to
family planning – condemning legislation criminalizing abortion and
advocating the availability of safe measures of birth control – they are
just as wary of the treatment of sex outside of the context of family and
family planning. Nothing that comes close to a right to enjoy one’s
sexuality is formulated, nor are any particular strong statements made
with respect to same-sex relationships. The failure of the treaties to deal
outright with an important dimension of sexual self-determination – the
freedom from coercion – is partly remedied by the committees by
prohibiting forced marriages and repeatedly condemning domestic
violence, including marital rape.50 The HRC and CEDAW are the most
outspoken on all aspects; the CESCR approaches sex as more of a
biological issue and places great emphasis on reproductive health – its
comments related to sexual rights are of a more indirect nature.51
The following section provides a brief survey of the interpretation
of reproductive rights by the treaty bodies. An intentional omission here
is a discussion of the sex worker and trafficking, which is relevant but
merits a more elaborate discussion than can be rendered within this
context. It is nevertheless briefly mentioned with regard to CEDAW as
this is the only treaty with a specific provision on the subject. This
provision is also taken as proscribing violence against women in general.
The autonomy to decide if and when to reproduce
The right to freedom in reproductive decision-making is based upon
broader principles of bodily autonomy and the right to physical
integrity.52 Reference to these concepts is usually made in the context of
50. See, e.g,. ICCPR, supra note 36, at art. 23(3); UDHR, supra note 36, at art. 16(2);
CEDAW, supra note 36, at art. 16(1)(a)(b) (regarding forced marriage).
51. See generally ICESCR, supra note 36.
52. Bringing Rights to Bear, supra note 36, at 16.
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a right to privacy or the right to liberty and security of the person. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights states in article 12 that “No one
shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy [or] family
. . . . Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.”53 Relevant rights in the ICCPR are – with a little
stretch54 – article 6 on the right to life,55 article 9 on the right to liberty
and security of person,56 and article 17 on the right to privacy, which
makes a specific reference to privacy in relation to family life.57
The most specific article on family planning is article 16
CEDAW.58 In short, States Parties take it upon themselves to ensure that
men and women have equal access to information regarding health care
services related to family planning, as well as the possibility to make
contraceptive choices. This forms an important part of what has been
defined as sexual self-determination in the introduction: a woman’s right
to decide freely if and when to reproduce. It should be borne in mind
here though, that this only applies in so far as the right is given extensive
interpretation. If there are any restrictions on the enjoyment of this right,
such as the requirement of a connection to the concept of family, it
would go against the idea of self-determination as it limits the enjoyment
of sex for the sake of sex.
According to General Recommendation 21 on Equality in Marriage
and Family Relations,59 no reservations can be made to this article, as
53. UDHR, supra note 36, at art. 12.
54. In practice, the Human Rights Committee does not interpret articles 6 and 9 very broadly
for the sake of reproductive rights. ICCPR, supra note 36.
55. Article 6(1): “Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be
protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.” Id. at art. 6(1).
56. Article 9(1): “Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person . . . .” Id. at art.
9(1).
57. Article 17: “(1) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. (2)
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” Id. at art.
17.
58. It states:
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against
women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular shall
ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women: . . . (e) The same rights to decide
freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of children and to have access to the
information, education and means to enable them to exercise these rights. . . .
CEDAW, supra note 36, at art. 16(1)(e). Another important article is article 10(h), which stresses
the equal right of women to have access to information and education in order to help ensure “the
health and well-being of families, including information and advice on family planning.” Id. at art.
10(h). Access to health care services, including “those related to family planning” should be
ensured by States Parties on the basis of article 12(1). Id. at art. 12(1).
59. U.N. CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 21: Equality in Marriage and Family
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that would be inconsistent with the principles of CEDAW. Yet, as
practice has shown, this article is a favorite amongst States Parties when
it comes to reservations and declarations of interpretation.60 CEDAW
also makes the connection to women’s rights in marriage in General
Recommendation 24,61 which qualifies the right of married women to
freely decide the number and spacing of children as fundamental.
The Human Rights Committee connects women’s reproductive
rights with their right to privacy under article 17 ICCPR in General
Comment 28,62 yet in its concluding observations noted concern that
limited access for women to reproductive health services is a violation of
women’s right to equality63 and their right to life.64 The Committee’s
position on abortion laws is particularly outspoken: due to the relation
between maternal mortality and abortion, it considers legislation
criminalizing abortion as a violation of the right to life.65 CEDAW has
Relations (13th Sess., 1994), U.N Doc. A/49/38 in Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 222, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (2004), at
261 [hereinafter General Recommendation No. 21].
60. It has been said that CEDAW “has attracted the greatest number of substantive
reservations with the potential to modify or exclude most, if not all, of the terms of the treaty,”
Belinda Clark, The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and the Convention on Discrimination
Against Women, 85 A.J.I.L. 281, 317 (1991). For a survey of the wide practice of making
reservations to CEDAW, see Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 643 (1989-1990).
61. U.N. CEDAW, General Recommendation 24: Women and Health (20th Sess., 1999),
U.N. Doc. A/54/38/Rev.1, ch. I, in Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 281, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (2004)
[hereinafter General Recommendation No. 24].
62. U.N. HRC, General Comment 28: Equality of Rights Between Men and Women, art. 3,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/add.10 (68th Sess., 2000), in Compilation of General Comments and
General Recommendations by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 181, para. 20, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN
/1/Rev.7 (2004) [hereinafter General Comment No. 28].
63. See U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of
the Covenant: Concluding Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Peru, para. 20, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/CO/70/PER (Nov. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Peru HRC]; U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by the
Human Rights Committee: Poland, para. 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.110 (July 29, 1999)
[hereinafter Poland HRC].
64. See U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of
the Covenant: Concluding Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Chile, para. 15, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.104 (Mar. 30, 1999) [hereinafter Chile HRC]; Peru HRC, supra note 63;
Poland HRC, supra note 63.
65. In the case of Ecuador, the Committee went as far as connecting a high suicide rate among
young girls with the restrictive access to abortion and considering that as a violation of the young
women’s right to life. U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under
Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Ecuador,
para. 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.92 (Aug. 18, 1998). See also U.N. HRC, Consideration of
Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by
the Human Rights Committee: Republic of Guatemala, para. 19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/72/GTM
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taken a similar approach, urging States Parties to legalize abortion with
the view of reducing abortion-related deaths.66 Especially in the case of
rape, safe abortion should be easily accessible.67 Increased availability of
(Aug. 27, 2001) [hereinafter Guatemala HRC]; Chile HRC, supra note 64; U.N. HRC,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding
Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Costa Rica, para. 11, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.107 (Apr. 4, 1999) [hereinafter Costa Rica HRC]; Poland HRC, supra note 63.
Other than that, the Committee has requested the abolishment of restrictive abortion laws, see U.N.
HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant:
Concluding Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Argentina, para. 14, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/CO/70/ARG (Nov. 3, 2000) [hereinafter Argentina HRC]; Ecuador, supra; Guatemala HRC,
supra; Peru HRC, supra note 63; Poland HRC, supra note 63.; U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by the
Human Rights Committee: Senegal, para. 12, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 82 (Nov. 19, 1997)
[hereinafter Senegal HRC], as well as any other barriers barring the access to health information.
See(Guatemala HRC, supra; U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by the Human Rights Committee:
Mongolia, para. 8(b), U.N. Doc . CCPR/C/79/Add.120 (Apr. 25, 2000) [hereinafter Mongolia
HRC]; Poland HRC, supra note 63. Family planning counseling, see, e.g., Argentina HRC, supra,
sex education, see Poland HRC, supra note 63, safe contraceptives, see Argentina HRC, supra;
U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant:
Concluding Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Colombia, para. 37, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.76 (May 5, 1997) [hereinafter Columbia HRC]; U.N. HRC, Consideration of
Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by
the Human Rights Committee : Georgia, para. 12, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.75 (May 5, 1997),
and safe abortion services, Argentina HRC, supra; Guatemala HRC, supra, should be available on
an equal basis, and the requirement that health personnel report on women undergoing abortion is
considered unacceptable. See Chile HRC, supra note 64; U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by the
Human Rights Committee: Venezuela, para. 19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/71/VEN (Apr. 26, 2001)
[hereinafter Venezuela HRC].
66. See U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women: Colombia, para. 393-94, U.N. Doc. A/54/38 (Feb. 4, 1999)
[hereinafter Columbia CEDAW]; U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Dominican Republic, para. 349, U.N. Doc. A/53/38,
(May, 14, 1998); U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women: Namibia, Part II , para. 127, U.N. Doc. A/52/38/Rev.1 (Aug. 12,
1997) [hereinafter Namibia CEDAW]; U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Nepal, para. 147-148, U.N. Doc.
A/54/38/Rev.1 (July 1, 1999) [hereinafter Nepal CEDAW]; U.N. CEDAW, Concluding
Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Paraguay,
para. 131, U.N. Doc. A/51/38 (May 9, 1996); U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Peru, para. 340, U.N. Doc.
A/53/38/Rev.1 (July 8, 1998).
67. See U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women: Jordan, para. 180, U.N. Doc. A/55/38, (Jan. 27, 2000); U.N.
CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women: Panama, para. 201, U.N. Doc. A/53/38/Rev.1 (July 2, 1998) [hereinafter Panama
CEDAW]; U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women: Venezuela, para. 236, U.N. Doc. A/52/38/Rev.1 (Aug. 12, 1997)
[hereinafter Venezuela CEDAW]; U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on
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contraceptives68 and other measures preventing abortion to be used as a
means of birth control69 are recommended. One cannot help but notice
that both committees do not call for an unequivocal right to have an
abortion; the committees state that it should not be criminalized by law,
but the underlying argument (or justification) appears to be mainly
health-based, namely the prevention of maternal mortality. CEDAW’s
exception to that line of reasoning with respect to rape is a significant
but narrow one.
Sliding down the spectrum towards an exclusively health-riskfocused approach, we find the CESCR, which in General Comment 1470
focuses primarily on the reduction of maternal mortality rates. The need
for better information on contraceptives has been addressed in relation to
teenage pregnancies71 and, according to the Committee, information
programs should be used together with family planning policies as a
means of reducing the use of abortion as a method for family planning.72
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Uruguay, para. 196, U.N. Doc. A/57/38 (Part I),
(May 5, 2002).
68. U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women: Burundi, para. 62, U.N. Doc. A/56/38 (Feb. 2, 2001) [hereinafter
Burundi CEDAW]; U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination
of Discrimination Against Women: Cameroon, para. 60, U.N. Doc. A/55/38 (June 26, 2000)
[hereinafter Cameroon CEDAW]; Colombia CEDAW, supra note 66, at para. 396; U.N. CEDAW,
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women:
Democratic Republic of the Congo, para. 228, U.N. Doc. A/55/38 (Feb. 1, 2000); U.N. CEDAW,
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women:
Nicaragua, para. 303, U.N. Doc. A/56/38 (July 31, 2001) [hereinafter Nicaragua CEDAW];
Venezuela CEDAW, supra note 67, at para. 243.
69. Burundi CEDAW, supra note 68, at para. 62; U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Kyrgyzstan, para. 136, U.N.
Doc. A/54/38 (Jan. 27, 1999); U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Romania, para. 315, U.N. Doc. A/55/38 (June 23,
2000); U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women: Uzbekistan, paras. 185-186, U.N. Doc. A/56/38 (Feb. 2, 2001);
U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women: Vietnam, para. 266, U.N. Doc. A/56/38 (July 31, 2001) [hereinafter Vietnam
CEDAW]; U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women: Estonia, para. 111, U.N. Doc. A/57/38 (Part I) (May 7, 2002).
70. U.N. CESCR, General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of
Health, art. 12, U.N. E/C.12/2000/4 (22nd Sess., 2000), in Compilation of General Comments and
General Recommendations by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 92, para. 21, U.N. Doc. HRI
/GEN/1/Rev.7 (2004) [hereinafter General Comment No. 14].
71. See U.N. CESCR, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16
and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights: Cameroon, para. 45, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.40 (Dec, 8, 1999) [hereinafter
Cameroon CESCR].
72. See, e.g., U.N. CESCR, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under
Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic,
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Yet, the CESCR is more reticent than the HRC and CEDAW, having
requested the liberalization of abortion laws on merely one occasion,73 in
spite of its concern about the correlation between maternal mortality and
abortions carried out outside the health profession.74
The ability to enjoy one’s sexuality free from coercion or
pressure
This category could be rooted in a number of the rights mentioned
under the previous heading as well, in particular those referring to bodily
integrity and autonomy. When it comes to a general reference to a right
to be free from gender-based or sexual violence, CEDAW unfortunately
falls short. There are two articles in the Convention that are considered
to include the right to be free from sexual violence, article 5(a)75 and
article 6.76 Article 5(a) prescribes the obligation of States Parties to
eliminate “customary and all other practices which are based on the idea
of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on
stereotyped roles for men and women.”77 Appropriate measures to
suppress the trafficking of women and “exploitation of prostitution of
women” should be taken according to article 6.78 Other international
treaties79 and declarations80 have made more explicit reference to the
prohibition of sexual violence against women, but within the context of
the human rights documents under discussion here, much depends on the
Social, and Cultural Rights: Poland, para. 12, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.26 (June 16, 1998); U.N.
CESCR, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the
Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights:
Senegal, para. 47, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.62 (Sept. 24, 2001); U.N. CESCR, Consideration of
Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding
Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Ukraine, para. 31, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.65 (Sept. 24, 2001).
73. U.N. CESCR, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16
and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights: Nepal, para. 33, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.66 (Sept. 24, 2001) [hereinafter Nepal
CESCR].
74. See Cameroon CESCR, supra note 71, at para. 25; U.N. CESCR, Consideration of
Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding
Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Mexico, para. 29, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.41 (Dec. 8, 1999); Nepal CESCR, supra note 73, at para. 32.
75. CEDAW, supra note 36, at art. 5(a).
76. Id. at art. 6.
77. Id. at art. 5(a).
78. Id. at art. 6.
79. See Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of
Violence Against Women, June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1534.
80. See Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N.
Doc. A/48/49 (Dec. 20, 1993).
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interpretation given to concepts such as liberty, security of person, and
bodily integrity.
Even though violence against women does not have its own
provision in CEDAW, it is high on the Committee’s agenda, which is
reflected by its concluding observations.81 The starting point for the
Committee is that violence against women exists in all countries and that
not presenting data on the subject calls for further inquiries by CEDAW
in order to obtain those.82 Special attention is paid to the intersection
with race and other social characteristics.83 The Committee has
comprehensively condemned domestic violence,84 as well as sexual
violence and sexual harassment in general. Domestic violence is
explicitly taken to include marital rape, which governments are
recommended to make punishable under criminal law.85 Making the link
between sexual violence and reproductive rights, the Committee has
declared that sexual abuse of girls by older men violates girls’
reproductive rights,86 and the Committee has condemned the prohibition
of abortion extended to cases of rape.87
The HRC’s General Comment 28 condemns domestic violence,

81. See infra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
82. See Cameroon CEDAW, supra note 68, at para. 65; U.N. CEDAW, Concluding
Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Germany,
para. 306, U.N. Doc. A/55/38 (Feb. 2, 2000) [hereinafter Germany CEDAW]; U.N. CEDAW,
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women:
Ireland, para. 188, U.N. Doc. A/54/38 (July 1, 1999).
83. See, e.g., Germany CEDAW, supra note 82, at para. 318.
84. See Cameroon CEDAW, supra note 68, at para. 49–50; U.N. CEDAW, Concluding
Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Egypt, para.
342, U.N. Doc. A/56/38 (Feb. 2, 2001) [hereinafter Egypt CEDAW]; Germany CEDAW, supra
note 82, at paras. 306, 308; U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Italy, para. 359, U.N. Doc. A/52/38/Re v.1, Part II
(Aug. 12, 1997); U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women: Netherlands, para. 207, U.N. Doc. A/56/38 (July 31, 2001); U.N.
CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women: New Zealand, para. 279, U.N. Doc. A/53/38/Rev.1 (July 9, 1998); Venezuela CEDAW,
supra note 67, at para. 233; Vietnam CEDAW, supra note 69, at para. 258.
85. See, e.g., Egypt CEDAW, supra note 84, at para. 344; U.N. CEDAW, Concluding
Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Greece, para.
192, U.N. Doc. A/54/38 (Feb. 2, 1999); Namibia CEDAW, supra note 66, at Part II, para. 120; U.N.
CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women: Thailand, para. 243, U.N. Doc. A/54/38 (Feb. 2, 1999); Vietnam CEDAW, supra note 69,
paras. 258–59.
86. See Nicaragua CEDAW, supra note 68, at paras. 298–99.
87. See Colombia CEDAW, supra note 66, at para. 393; Nepal CEDAW, supra note 66, at
para. 147; Panama CEDAW, supra note 67, at para. 201; Venezuela CEDAW, supra note 67, at
para. 236.
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together with sexual violence against women88 as a violation of article 7
ICCPR and the Committee’s Concluding Observations on domestic
violence are numerous,89 reiterating that all domestic violence including marital rape90 - should be criminalized.91 The CESCR
considers domestic violence against women a health risk,92 as stated in
88. General Comment 28, supra note 62; Argentina HRC, supra note 65, at para. 15; U.N.
HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant:
Concluding Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Czech Republic, para. 23, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/CO/72/CZE (Aug. 27, 2001) [hereinafter Czech Republic HRC]; U.N. HRC, Consideration
of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations
by the Human Rights Committee: India, para. 16, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.81 (Aug. 4, 1997)
[hereinafter India HRC]; U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under
Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Japan, para.
30, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.102 (Nov. 19, 1998) [hereinafter Japan HRC]; U.N. HRC,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding
Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Russian Federation, para. 14, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.54 (July 26, 1995) [hereinafter Russian Federation HRC]; U.N. HRC,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Comments
of the Human Rights Committee: United States of America., para. 285, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.50, A/50/40 (Oct. 3, 1995); U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by the Human Rights
Committee: Uruguay., para. 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.90 (Apr. 8, 1998); Venezuela HRC,
supra note 65, at paras. 17, 20, 26.
89. Some examples are Argentina HRC, supra note 65, at para. 15; Colombia HRC, supra
note 65, at para. 27; U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article
40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Guyana, para. 14,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.121 (Apr. 25, 2000); India HRC, supra note 88; Japan, supra note 88;
U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant:
Concluding Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Mexico, para. 17, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.32 (Apr. 18, 1994); Russian Federation HRC, supra note 88; Senegal HRC, supra
note 65, at para. 13; U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article
40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Uzbekistan, para.
19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/71/UZB (Apr. 26, 2001) [hereinafter Uzbekistan HRC]; U.N. HRC,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding
Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Yemen, para. 255, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 51,
A/50/40 (Oct. 3, 1995) [hereinafter Yemen HRC]; U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted
by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by the Human Rights
Committee: Zimbabwe, para. 14, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 89 (Apr. 6, 1998) [hereinafter
Zimbabwe HRC].
90. See India HRC, supra note 88; Mongolia HRC, supra note 65, at para. 8(g); Uzbekistan
HRC, supra note 89; Zimbabwe HRC, supra note 89.
91. See Costa Rica HRC, supra note 65, at para. 12; Czech Republic HRC, supra note 88, at
para. 14; U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the
Covenant: Concluding Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Guatemala, para. 33, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.63 (Apr. 3, 1996); Japan HRC, supra note 88; U.N. HRC, Consideration of
Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by
the Human Rights Committee: The Kyrgyz Republic, para. 14, U.N. Doc. CPR/CO/69/KGZ (July
24, 2000); Russian Federation HRC, supra note 88; Senegal HRC, supra note 65, at para. 13;
Uzbekistan HRC, supra note 89; Yemen HRC, supra note 89.
92. Id. at para. 21.
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General Comment 14.93 Legislation that does not proscribe marital rape
has been criticized in a number of Concluding Observations.94
CEDAW also defines forced marriage as a form of violence against
women in General Recommendation 19.95 Applying this concept in its
Concluding Observations, CEDAW has recommended that States
criminalize the practice of forced marriage and also provide training for
State officials to create a greater sensitivity to this and other types of
violence against women.96 The Human Rights Committee follows this
line of reasoning in General Comment 28 on the Equality of Rights
between Men and Women,97 in which it underlines that women have a
right to freely make an informed choice on whom they marry. However,
the Committee has not fully integrated these statements in its
Concluding Observations beyond a repeated expression of general
concern.98 It has made some recommendations on eliminating the
practice though, including education aiming to change social attitudes
93. General Comment No. 14, supra note 70, at 92.
94. See U.N. CESCR, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16
and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights: Egypt, para. 35, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.44 (May 23, 2000); U.N. CESCR,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant:
Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Mongolia,
para. 23, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.47 (Sept. 1, 2000); U.N. CESCR, Consideration of Reports
Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of
the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Syrian Arab Republic, paras. 24, 40, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.63 (Sept. 24, 2001) [hereinafter Syrian Arab Republic CESCR].
95. U.N. CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 19: Violence against Women (11th Sess.,
1992), U.N. Doc. A/47/38, in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations by
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 247, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (2004) [hereinafter General
Recommendation No. 19].
96. See, e.g., U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women: Guinea, paras. 134-35, U.N. Doc. A/56/38 (July 31, 2001), and
Vietnam CEDAW, supra note 69, at paras. 258–59.
97. General Comment No. 28, supra note 62, at 182.
98. See, e.g., India HRC, supra note 88; U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by the Human Rights
Committee: Kuwait, para. 7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/69/KW T (July 27, 2000); U.N. HRC,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding
Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Nigeria, para. 291, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.65,
A/52/40 (July 24, 1996) [hereinafter Nigeria HRC]; U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted
by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by the Human Rights
Committee: Peru, para. 14, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.72 (Nov. 18, 1996); U.N. HRC,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding
Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Sudan, para. 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.85
(Nov. 19, 1997); U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40
of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Syrian Arab Republic,
para. 20, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/71/SYR (Apr. 24, 2001); Venezuela HRC, supra note 65, at paras.
18, 20; Zimbabwe HRC, supra note 89, at para. 12.
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towards forced marriage99 and legal reform.100 The CESCR has spoken
out against forced marriage in its Concluding Observations101 by urging
countries to focus on the elimination of the practice as well as the
customary beliefs that encourage it, but this viewpoint has not made its
way into the Committee’s general comments yet.
Sexual self-determination beyond freedom from coercion and
unwanted pregnancy: women’s freedom to enjoy their
sexuality on a par with men
None of the committees make reference to reproductive rights
beyond the principle of freedom from coercion and the right to make
independent decisions on procreation, nor do they formulate a right of
women to enjoy their sexuality on a par with men. The only references
which can be interpreted as sex outside the realm of procreation are
made with respect to sexual orientation and then often in connection
with the family concept, except for the CESCR, which takes a stand only
in relation with the access to health care102 and has just once asked a
State to proscribe discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in its
Concluding Observations.103
In its General Recommendation 21 on Equality in Marriage and
Family Relations,104 CEDAW asserts that “family” can mean various
things depending on a number of factors such as religion, custom, and
tradition.105 The Human Rights Committee lays down a similar principle
and says that whichever concept is accepted in a particular country, it
should be given the protection against discrimination in the ICCPR’s
implementation as guaranteed in article 2.106 This provides not much of a
99. See, e.g., India HRC, supra note 88; Nigeria HRC, supra note 98.
100. See, e.g., U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article
40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Monaco, para. 12,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/72/MCO (Aug. 28, 2001); Venezuela HRC, supra note 65, at paras. 18, 20.
101. See Cameroon CESCR, supra note 71, at paras. 14, 33; U.N. CESCR, Consideration of
Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding
Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Kyrgyzstan, paras. 16,
23, 30, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.49 (Sept. 1, 2000); Syrian Arab Republic CESCR, supra note 94,
at paras. 14, 31.
102. General Comment No. 14, supra note 70.
103. See U.N. CESCR, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16
and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights: China-Hong Kong SPECIAL Administrative Region, para. 31, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.58 (May 21, 2001).
104. General Recommendation No. 21, supra note 59, at 261.
105. Id. at 256.
106. U.N. HRC, General Comment No. 18: Non–Discrimination (37th Sess., 1989), in
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basis for a same-sex couple to obtain recognition as a family by
appealing to the ICCPR, even though the Committee has condemned
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation in its Concluding
Observations.107 CEDAW has also spoken out against discrimination on
the grounds of sexual orientation in its Concluding Observations; it has –
as the only treaty body so far – considered sexual orientation a valid
ground for asylum,108 and it has expressed its concern about the
criminalization of homosexuality.109 Yet, from a committee that has
empowerment of women as a guiding principle and has agreed upon
using the Cairo Programme as a guideline for developing performance
standards in its general recommendations,110 one might expect a more
progressive approach. Surely, it would be a difficult task to define which
parameters could be used to measure government compliance, but that
should not stop the Committee from formulating a standpoint that truly
empowers women – explicitly establishing them as sexual beings
beyond reproduction.
PART III: EXTENSIVE INTERPRETATION OR REDEFINITION?
An explicit right for women to enjoy their sexuality on equal terms
is not formulated in any of the treaties. On the basis of the formulation
of the rights connected to reproductive self-determination, there appears
to be a stronger basis for the component related to the freedom to decide
whether to reproduce than for the freedom to enjoy one’s sexuality free
from coercion. For the latter, the emphasis lies on freedom from
violence, not on the aspect of enjoyment. How far this freedom extends
depends on the interpretation of the rights enumerated and in particular
whether any explicit or implicit connection to some sort of family life is
required.

Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations by Human Rights Treaty
Bodies, at 147, para. 5, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (2004).
107. See, e.g., U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article
40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by the Human Rights Committee: United Kingdom
and Northern Ireland-The Crown Dependencies of Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man, para. 14,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.119 (Mar. 27, 2000).
108. U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women: Sweden, para. 334, U.N. Doc. A/56/38 (July 31, 2001).
109. See, e.g., U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women: Mexico, para. 420, U.N. Doc. A/53/38 (May 14, 1998).
110. U.N. CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 22, Amending Article 20 of the Convention
(14th Sess., 1995), U.N. Doc. A/50/38, in Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 250, U.N Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6
(2003).
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Looking at the recommendations and observations made by the
treaty bodies, we can conclude that their strongest points are freedom
from coercion and the freedom to make reproductive decisions. In both
cases the HRC and CEDAW are the most outspoken; the CESCR tends
to make less strong statements, and if it does, the comments have a
qualifying connection with health issues. Besides some relatively weak
references in the context of the rights of same-sex couples under the
treaty regimes, no reference can be found to matters related to sex
beyond procreation, and even then the references are made in connection
with the concept of family.
One can only guess why the respective committees have not yet
addressed this aspect of sexual rights. A possible motive could be that it
is difficult for the committees’ members to reach consensus on the
matter and that therefore the focus has remained on the more clear-cut
subject of sex as biology. On the other hand, abortion and birth control
are controversial subjects in their own right, and negotiations on
declarations such as those made by the Cairo and Beijing conference
have not lacked ample resistance from the Holy See and a great number
of Catholic and Islamic countries.111 In addition, it is not necessarily true
that reaching a broad consensus yields the best result for women’s
reproductive rights. The Cairo Programme of Action was the result of
extensive lobbying by women’s organizations, but it has been argued to
have actually resulted in a setback instead of a step forward.112
Another reason could be that the committees have not yet found a
way to incorporate sexual rights as defined by Cairo and Beijing broadly
into their work, or do not consider them important enough to be put high
on their agendas alongside matters such as reproductive health. The
question that follows is whether this is a subject on which the
committees should develop their own doctrine, or whether the treaties
lack sufficient definition of sexual rights such that the committees ought
to give it the attention it needs by codifying standards.
Even though the setting of a clear, well-defined standard may seem
appealing at first sight, there are sufficient grounds on which to argue
against codification of a right to sexual self-determination, at least at this
111. See Rishona Fleishman, Comment, The Battle Against Reproductive Rights: The Impact
of the Catholic Church on Abortion Law in Both International and Domestic Arenas, 14 EMORY
INT’L REV. 277, 283-89 (2000). For a brief moment, it looked like the Vatican and a number of
Islamic groups were willing to form an occasional alliance at the Cairo Conference to block an all
too liberal take on abortion and same-sex relationships. See The Vatican and Islamic Groups at
Cairo, POPULATION NETWORK NEWS (Chantal Worzala ed., Human Development Dept. no. 9, Fall
1994), available at http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/hnp/hddflash/pnn/pnn9c.html.
112. See Nair et al., supra note 43.
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point. Fried and Landsberg-Lewis, who discuss the possibilities of
developing an agenda for sexual rights beyond the Cairo and Beijing
conferences,113 affirm that it is important that sexual rights are
acknowledged as a fundamental aspect of women’s human rights and
human dignity, but they argue that it is important to “sustain the fluidity
of the concept and its ability to include an ever-growing understanding
of the range of experiences heterosexual, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgendered women have as sexual beings and to expand the
boundaries of what sexual rights mean, rather than limiting its
application and meaning with over-definition.”114 A set definition – if
one could even be drafted properly – would perhaps make it easier for an
individual or human rights organization to make a claim about the
violation of these rights, but at the same time, a fixed definition entails
the risk of excluding certain situations and therefore resulting in an
applicability that is more limited than would be desirable.
The problem of exclusion by means of definition naturally does not
apply to reproductive rights alone, but it might play a more significant
role due to the special nature of sexual rights. As only limitedly
surveyed in Part II, the issue of reproductive rights is interconnected
with a great number of different rights, each of which entail a different
type of State obligation, thereby making it more difficult to catch
everything in one definition. As Fried and Landsberg-Lewis put it, the
protection of sexual rights poses a strong challenge to the human rights
framework, as it calls for the articulation of the “other side” of human
rights, namely “the positive assertion of the full exercise and enjoyment
of rights, including free expression of sexual identity.”115 In other words:
sexual rights require action that would constitute a significant step
beyond protection.116
Another difficulty is fitting a theoretical definition of a right to
sexual self-determination into the mold of purportedly neutral phrasing
and equality-focused terminology as generally used in the human rights
doctrine. Women need special protection when it comes to their
reproductive rights, yet if such a right would be formulated in terms of
equality, this implies equality to a male standard, which then excludes
anything falling outside this model.117 Arguably, the focus should not be

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Fried & Landsberg-Lewis, supra note 33, at 114-16
Id. at 114.
Id. at 116.
Miller, supra note 40 and accompanying text.
Fried & Landsberg-Lewis, supra note 33, at 115.
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on such formal equality, but rather on effective equality.118 The way to
achieve such de facto equality certainly is not one and the same in all
situations, and it would depend on the particular situation in each
country what type of action is required. Starting with measures such as
legal reform, one could think of education and other means of informing
people and raising public awareness – not only in relation to, for
example, the use of contraceptives and family planning, but also in order
to challenge certain stereotypes or cultural practices existing within
society that have a detrimental effect on women’s enjoyment of their
sexual rights. Women’s organizations could play a significant role
here.119 By incorporating women’s reproductive rights, including their
right to sexual self-determination, into their agendas120 instead of
treating it as a separate issue, eventually a more heightened awareness
can be created which eventually could lead to the treaty bodies raising
the issue more easily outside of the obvious context of health and family.
With respect to how broad an issue on the agenda this should be, it
is important that women’s organizations and human rights NGO’s take
the lead in interpreting reproductive rights as broadly as possible. It is
perhaps a natural reflex to consider the right to enjoy one’s sexuality
insignificant when faced with situations in which women are forced to
marry a partner that is not of their choice at a young age, have no means
to prevent or end an unwanted pregnancy even if it was the result of nonconsensual intercourse, or cannot find any legal redress when they are
the victim of sexual violence within or outside of wedlock. Yet, that
there are situations that are more egregious than not being able to be the
sexual person one wants to be does not make the issue of sexual selfdetermination less important. On this point I would like to quote Lynn
Freedman, who argues that reproduction and sexuality have an intrinsic
value as an essential element of human dignity: “Although control over
reproduction and sexuality is certainly an essential precondition for
women’s ability to exercise other rights and to fulfill other basic needs,
it is also a worthy and valuable end in its own right, and not merely a
means to reach other ends.”121 That there are other obstacles on the road
to women’s full enjoyment of their right to sexual self-determination that
118. Id.
119. See id. at 116-20.
120. Fried and Landsberg-Lewis name a number of examples in their article, but the list, which
includes Amnesty International and a number of local organizations, is not extensive. Id.
121. Lynn P. Freedman, Censorship and Manipulation of Reproductive Health Information: An
Issue of Human Rights and Women’s Health, in THE RIGHT TO KNOW: HUMAN RIGHTS AND
ACCESS TO REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH INFORMATION 5 (Sandra Coliver ed., University of
Pennsylvania Press 1995).
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need to be addressed does not mean that goal should not be kept in sight
in its full form, repeatedly articulated and affirmed, and integrated in the
human rights doctrine.
A final significant roadblock for the committees taking a more
progressive stance is a factor that has only been touched upon in this
article, and that is the fact that a real right to sexual self-determination
and independence – outside the confines of a family bond – besides the
endorsement of ‘loose’ sexual behavior by women in general,
automatically includes the possibility of same-sex relationships. As
Phillips voices the problem:
The concept of sexual rights brings to the center stage the tense
relationship between claims to universality inherent in human rights
and cultural relativism of expressions of intimacy, reproduction,
gender relations, and identity that are so frequently central to national,
religious, and moral discourses. . . . While . . . claims [to traditional
culture or religious values] have been unequivocally rejected as a
defense for other forms of discrimination, this does not appear to be so
clearly the approach when it comes to issues of sexual orientation.122

This complex issue cannot be done justice within the scope of this
brief article, but it would certainly be worth asking the question why the
committees have little trouble speaking out against other highly
culturally determined practices such as arranged marriage or female
genital cutting,123 yet show such restraint when it comes to sex.124
CONCLUSION
The three main treaty monitoring bodies have not yet
acknowledged an all-encompassing right to sexual self-determination for
women. They have affirmed, in various levels of decisiveness, the right
to enjoy reproductive rights free from coercion or pressure and the
freedom to decide if and when to reproduce. The unlinking of sex from
reproduction or the family concept, however, is a step the committees
122. Phillips, supra note 12, at 463.
123. U.N. CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 14: Female Circumcision (9th Sess., 1990),
in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations by Human Rights Treaty
Bodies, at 211, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (2004); General Recommendation No. 19, supra note
95, at paras. 11, 20, 24(l); General Recommendation No. 24, supra note 61, at para. 15(d); General
Comment No. 28, supra note 62, at para. 11; General Comment No. 14, supra note 71, at para. 22.
124. On the shortcomings of CEDAW and the UDHR when it comes to the position of
lesbians, see Nadine Gartner, Articulating Lesbian Human Rights: The Creation of a Convention on
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Lesbians, 14 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 61
(2005).
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have yet to take.
It is important that they do not go down the path the U.S. Supreme
Court has taken, interpreting sex as a subset of what is apparently
considered a more valuable type of inter-human relationship, and
thereby casting a glooming shadow of Puritanism over what should be a
positive aspect of people’s lives. Sex is an important part of who we are,
and it is a part women should be equally capable of exploring as men.
And if the treaty bodies have trouble talking about sex, civil society
should continue addressing the subject within all relevant contexts until
they do. Hopefully, it will not take them too long to stop and listen.
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